0f52a05723
This fixes the following security problems:
CVE-2025-14282: Avoid privilege escalation via unix stream forwarding in Dropbear server.
CVE-2019-6111: This allowed a malicious server to overwrite arbitrary local files.
This backports two upstream merged PRs:
https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/pull/391
https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/pull/394
and this upstream commit:
48a17cff6a
Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/21192
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
154 lines
4.2 KiB
Diff
154 lines
4.2 KiB
Diff
From 5938a084b0aad887c0f7fa62bf3644d029e4d47d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au>
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Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2025 22:59:19 +0900
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Subject: scp CVE-2019-6111 fix
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Cherry-pick from OpenSSH portable
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391ffc4b9d31 ("upstream: check in scp client that filenames sent during")
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upstream: check in scp client that filenames sent during
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remote->local directory copies satisfy the wildcard specified by the user.
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This checking provides some protection against a malicious server
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sending unexpected filenames, but it comes at a risk of rejecting wanted
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files due to differences between client and server wildcard expansion rules.
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For this reason, this also adds a new -T flag to disable the check.
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reported by Harry Sintonen
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fix approach suggested by markus@;
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has been in snaps for ~1wk courtesy deraadt@
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(cherry picked from commit 48a17cff6aa104b8e806ddb2191f83f1024060f1)
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---
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src/scp.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
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1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
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--- a/src/scp.c
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+++ b/src/scp.c
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@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@
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#include "includes.h"
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/*RCSID("$OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.130 2006/01/31 10:35:43 djm Exp $");*/
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+#include <fnmatch.h>
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+
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#include "atomicio.h"
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#include "compat.h"
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#include "scpmisc.h"
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@@ -291,14 +293,14 @@ void verifydir(char *);
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uid_t userid;
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int errs, remin, remout;
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-int pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory;
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+int Tflag, pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory;
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#define CMDNEEDS 64
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char cmd[CMDNEEDS]; /* must hold "rcp -r -p -d\0" */
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int response(void);
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void rsource(char *, struct stat *);
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-void sink(int, char *[]);
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+void sink(int, char *[], const char *);
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void source(int, char *[]);
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void tolocal(int, char *[]);
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void toremote(char *, int, char *[]);
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@@ -325,8 +327,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
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args.list = NULL;
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addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program);
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- fflag = tflag = 0;
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- while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dfl:prtvBCc:i:P:q1246S:o:F:")) != -1)
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+ fflag = Tflag = tflag = 0;
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+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dfl:prtTvBCc:i:P:q1246S:o:F:")) != -1)
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switch (ch) {
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/* User-visible flags. */
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case '1':
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@@ -389,9 +391,12 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
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setmode(0, O_BINARY);
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#endif
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break;
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+ case 'T':
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+ Tflag = 1;
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+ break;
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default:
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usage();
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- }
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+ }
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argc -= optind;
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argv += optind;
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@@ -409,7 +414,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
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}
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if (tflag) {
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/* Receive data. */
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- sink(argc, argv);
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+ sink(argc, argv, NULL);
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exit(errs != 0);
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}
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if (argc < 2)
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@@ -589,7 +594,7 @@ tolocal(int argc, char **argv)
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continue;
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}
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xfree(bp);
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- sink(1, argv + argc - 1);
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+ sink(1, argv + argc - 1, src);
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(void) close(remin);
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remin = remout = -1;
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}
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@@ -822,7 +827,7 @@ bwlimit(int amount)
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}
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void
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-sink(int argc, char **argv)
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+sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src)
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{
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static BUF buffer;
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struct stat stb;
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@@ -836,6 +841,7 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
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off_t size, statbytes;
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int setimes, targisdir, wrerrno = 0;
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char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048];
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+ char *src_copy = NULL, *restrict_pattern = NULL;
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struct timeval tv[2];
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#define atime tv[0]
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@@ -857,6 +863,17 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
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(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
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if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode))
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targisdir = 1;
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+ if (src != NULL && !iamrecursive && !Tflag) {
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+ /*
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+ * Prepare to try to restrict incoming filenames to match
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+ * the requested destination file glob.
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+ */
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+ if ((src_copy = strdup(src)) == NULL)
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+ fatal("strdup failed");
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+ if ((restrict_pattern = strrchr(src_copy, '/')) != NULL) {
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+ *restrict_pattern++ = '\0';
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+ }
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+ }
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for (first = 1;; first = 0) {
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cp = buf;
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if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1)
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@@ -939,6 +956,9 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
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run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp);
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exit(1);
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}
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+ if (restrict_pattern != NULL &&
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+ fnmatch(restrict_pattern, cp, 0) != 0)
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+ SCREWUP("filename does not match request");
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if (targisdir) {
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static char *namebuf = NULL;
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static size_t cursize = 0;
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@@ -977,7 +997,7 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
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goto bad;
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}
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vect[0] = xstrdup(np);
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- sink(1, vect);
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+ sink(1, vect, src);
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if (setimes) {
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setimes = 0;
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if (utimes(vect[0], tv) < 0)
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